“You admit, then,” said I, “that the pleasant is good, but the painful evil. But I deprecate Prodicus’s verbal distinctions: for whether you call it pleasant, or delightful, or enjoyable, or from whatever derivation or in whatever way you please to denominate such things, most excellent Prodicus, use your own word and answer what I wish.” 118. Prodicus, therefore, laughing, agreed with me, as did the others. “But what, my friends,” I continued, “do you say to this? All actions that tend to this, that we may live without pain and pleasantly, are they not beautiful? and is not a beautiful action good and profitable?”. They agreed. “If then,” I said, “the pleasant is good, no one who either knows or thinks that other things are better than what he is doing, and that they are possible, still continues to do the same, when it is in his power to do the better; nor is to be overcome by one’s-self any thing else than ignorance, nor to be master of one’s-self any thing else than wisdom.” All agreed to this. “What then? Do you say that ignorance is a thing of this kind, to have a false opinion, and to be deceived about matters of great importance?” To this, likewise, all agreed. “Is it not the case then,” I said, “that no one willingly sets about things evil, or things which he thinks are evil, nor is this, as it seems, in the nature of man willingly to engage in things which he thinks are evil, instead of such as are good; and when of two evils he is compelled to choose one, no one will choose the greater, when it is in his power to choose the less.” 119. All these things were assented to by us all. “What then,” said I, “do you call dread and fear something? and the same that I do, (I address myself to you, Prodicus,) I mean by it a certain expectation of evil, whether you call it fear or dread.” It appeared to Protagoras and Hippias that dread and fear were of this nature, but to Prodicus that dread was, but fear not. “But,” said I, “it is of no consequence, Prodicus; but this is; if what we before said is true, will any man deliberately engage in things which he dreads, when it is in his power to engage in things which he does not dread? or is not this impossible from our former admissions? for it has been admitted that what he dreads he considers to be evil; and what he considers to be evil, no one either engages in or willingly receives.” These things, likewise, were agreed to by all.