therefore, Socrates, be persuaded by me, and on no account refuse. 6. _Socr._ My dear Crito, your zeal would be very commendable were it united with right principle; otherwise, by how much the more earnest it is, by so much is it the more sad. We must consider, therefore, whether this plan should be adopted or not. For I not now only, but always, am a person who will obey nothing within me but reason, according as it appears to me on mature deliberation to be best. And the reasons, which I formerly professed, I cannot now reject, because this misfortune \.bn 035.png has befallen me; but they appear to me in much the same light, and I respect and honour them as before; so that if we are unable to adduce any better at the present time, be assured that I shall not give in to you, even though the power of the multitude should endeavour to terrify us like children, by threatening more than it does now, bonds and death, and confiscation of property. How, therefore, may we consider the matter most conveniently? First of all, if we recur to the argument which you used about opinions, whether on former occasions it was rightly resolved or not, that we ought to pay attention to some opinions, and to others not; or whether, before it was necessary that I should die, it was rightly resolved, but now it has become clear that it was said idly for argument’s sake, though in reality it was merely jest and trifling. I desire then, Crito, to consider, in common with you, whether it will appear to me in a different light now that I am in this condition, or the same, and whether we shall give it up or yield to it. It was said, I think, on former occasions, by those who were thought to speak seriously, as I just now observed, that of the opinions which men entertain some should be very highly esteemed and others not. By the gods, Crito, does not this appear to you to be well said? For you, in all human probability, are out of all danger of dying to-morrow, and the present calamity will not lead your judgment astray. Consider then: does it not appear to you to have been rightly settled, that we ought not to respect all the opinions of men, but some we should and others not? Nor yet the opinions of all men, but of some we should and of others not? What say you? Is not this rightly resolved? _Cri._ It is. _Socr._ Therefore, we should respect the good but not the bad? _Cri._ Yes. _Socr._ And are not the good those of the wise, and the bad those of the foolish? _Cri._ How can it be otherwise? 7. _Socr._ Come then, how again were the following points settled? Does a man who practises gymnastic exercises, and applies himself to them, pay attention to the praise and censure and opinion of every one, or of that one man only who happens to be a physician or teacher of the exercises? _Cri._ Of that one only. _Socr._ He ought, therefore, to fear the censures and covet the praises of that one, but not those of the multitude. _Cri._ Clearly.