The works of Plato (Vol. 1 of 6) : $b A new and literal version chiefly from the text of Stallbaum — Plato — John Shaqi
The works of Plato (Vol. 1 of 6) : $b A new and literal version chiefly from the text of Stallbaum
Plato · en
Simmias and Cebes[17] both agree in admitting that Socrates has proved
the pre-existence of the soul, but insist that he has not shewn it to be
immortal, for that nothing hinders but that, according to the popular
opinion, it may be dispersed at the dissolution of the body. To which
Socrates replies, that if their former admissions are joined to his last
argument, the immortality, as well as the pre-existence of the soul, has
been sufficiently proved. For if it is true that any thing living is
produced from that which is dead, then the soul must exist after death,
otherwise it could not be produced again.
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Footnote 17:
§ 55-59.
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However to remove the apprehension that the soul may be dispersed by a
wind as it were, Socrates proceeds, in his third argument[18], to
examine that doubt more thoroughly. What then is meant by being
dispersed but being dissolved into its parts? In order therefore to a
thing being capable of dispersion it must be compounded of parts. Now
there are two kinds of things, one compounded, the other simple, the
former kind is subject to change, the latter not, and can be
comprehended by the mind alone. The one is visible, the other invisible;
and the soul, which is invisible, when it employs the bodily senses
wanders and is confused, but when it abstracts itself from the body it
attains to the knowledge of that which is eternal, immortal, and
unchangeable. The soul, therefore, being uncompounded and invisible must
be indissoluble, that is to say immortal.
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Footnote 18:
§ 61-75.
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Still Simmias and Cebes[19] are unconvinced. The former objects, that
the soul, according to Socrates’ own shewing, is nothing but a harmony
resulting from a combination of the parts of the body, and so may perish
with the body as the harmony of a lyre does when the lyre itself is
broken. And Cebes, though he admits that the soul is more durable than
the body, yet objects that it is not therefore of necessity immortal but
may in time wear out, and it is by no means clear that this is not its
last period.
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Footnote 19:
§ 76-84.
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