Rousseau and Romanticism — Jean-Jacques Rousseau — John Shaqi
Rousseau and Romanticism
Jean-Jacques Rousseau · en
But, though strictly considered, life is but a web of illusion and a
dream within a dream, it is a dream that needs to be managed with the
utmost discretion, if it is not to turn into a nightmare. In other
words, however much life may mock the metaphysician, the problem of
conduct remains. There is always the unity at the heart of the change;
it is possible, however, to get at this real and abiding element and
so at the standards with reference to which the dream of life may be
rightly managed only through a veil of illusion. The problem of the
One and the Many, the ultimate problem of thought, can therefore be
solved only by a right use of illusion. In close relation to illusion
and the questions that arise in connection with it is all that we
have come to sum up in the word imagination. The use of this word, at
least in anything like its present extension, is, one should note,
comparatively recent. Whole nations and periods of the past can
scarcely be said to have had any word corresponding to imagination in
this extended sense. Yet the thinkers of the past have treated, at
times profoundly, under the head of fiction or illusion the questions
that we should treat under the head of imagination.[5] In the “Masters
of Modern French Criticism” I was above all preoccupied with the
problem of the One and the Many and the failure of the nineteenth
century to deal with it adequately. My effort in this present work is
to show that this failure can be retrieved only by a deeper insight
into the imagination and its all-important rôle in both literature
and life. Man is cut off from immediate contact with anything abiding
and therefore worthy to be called real, and condemned to live in an
element of fiction or illusion, but he may, I have tried to show, lay
hold with the aid of the imagination on the element of oneness that
is inextricably blended with the manifoldness and change and to just
that extent may build up a sound model for imitation. One tends to
be an individualist with true standards, to put the matter somewhat
differently, only in so far as one understands the relation between
appearance and reality--what the philosophers call the epistemological
problem. This problem, though it cannot be solved abstractly and
metaphysically, can be solved practically and in terms of actual
conduct. Inasmuch as modern philosophy has failed to work out any such
solution, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that modern philosophy is
bankrupt, not merely from Kant, but from Descartes.