The social contract & discourses — Jean-Jacques Rousseau — John Shaqi
The social contract & discourses
Jean-Jacques Rousseau · en
the revolutionaries get the upper hand, he will have to sacrifice one
of his principles: he will have to side against either the actual or
the legitimate Sovereign. It is easy also to see that alienation of
liberty, even if possible for an individual, which Rousseau denies,
cannot bind his posterity. But, with all its faults, the view of Hobbes
is on the whole admirably, if ruthlessly, logical, and to it Rousseau
owes a great deal.
The special shape given to the second Social Contract theory by Hobbes
looks, at first sight, much like a combination, into a single act,
of both the contracts. This, however, is not the view he adopts. The
theory of a contract between government and people had, as we have
seen, been used mainly as a support for popular liberties, a means of
assertion against the government. Hobbes, whose whole aim is to make
his government Sovereign, can only do this by leaving the government
outside the contract: he thus avoids the necessity of submitting it to
any obligation whatsoever, and leaves it absolute and irresponsible. He
secures, in fact, not merely a State which has unbounded rights against
the individual, but a determinate authority with the right to enforce
those rights. His theory is not merely Statism (_étatisme_); it is pure
despotism.
It is clear that, if such a theory is to be upheld, it can stand only
by the view, which Hobbes shares with Grotius, that a man can alienate
not merely his own liberty, but also that of his descendants, and
that, consequently, a people as a whole can do the same. This is the
point at which both Locke and Rousseau attack it. Locke, whose aim is
largely to justify the Revolution of 1688, makes government depend,
not merely at its institution, but always, on the consent of the
governed, and regards all rulers as liable to be displaced if they
govern tyrannically. He omits, however, to provide any machinery short
of revolution for the expression of popular opinion, and, on the whole,
seems to regard the popular consent as something essentially tacit and
assumed. He regards the State as existing mainly to protect life and
property, and is, in all his assertions of popular rights, so cautious
as to reduce them almost to nothing. It is not till we come to Rousseau
that the second form of the contract theory is stated in its purest and
most logical form.