The social contract & discourses — Jean-Jacques Rousseau — John Shaqi
The social contract & discourses
Jean-Jacques Rousseau · en
First, then, we must always remember that Rousseau is writing in the
eighteenth century, and for the most part in France. Neither the French
monarchy nor the Genevese aristocracy loved outspoken criticism,
and Rousseau had always to be very careful what he said. This may
seem a curious statement to make about a man who suffered continual
persecution on account of his subversive doctrines; but, although
Rousseau was one of the most daring writers of his time, he was forced
continually to moderate his language and, as a rule, to confine himself
to generalisation instead of attacking particular abuses. Rousseau's
theory has often been decried as too abstract and metaphysical. This is
in many ways its great strength; but where it is excessively so, the
accident of time is to blame. In the eighteenth century it was, broadly
speaking, safe to generalise and unsafe to particularise. Scepticism
and discontent were the prevailing temper of the intellectual classes,
and a short-sighted despotism held that, as long as they were confined
to these, they would do little harm. Subversive doctrines were only
regarded as dangerous when they were so put as to appeal to the
masses; philosophy was regarded as impotent. The intellectuals of the
eighteenth century therefore generalised to their hearts' content, and
as a rule suffered little for their _lèse-majesté_: Voltaire is the
typical example of such generalisation. The spirit of the age favoured
such methods, and it was therefore natural for Rousseau to pursue
them. But his general remarks had such a way of bearing very obvious
particular applications, and were so obviously inspired by a particular
attitude towards the government of his day, that even philosophy became
in his hands unsafe, and he was attacked for what men read between
the lines of his works. It is owing to this faculty of giving his
generalisations content and actuality that Rousseau has become the
father of modern political philosophy. He uses the method of his time
only to transcend it; out of the abstract and general he creates the
concrete and universal.