"Your answers (to the objection in question) are not the right ones. Here there cannot yet be a question of the thing in itself, and the distinction between representation and object is inadmissible: the world is representation. The matter stands rather as follows--Fichte's derivation of the _Non-Ego_ from the _Ego_, is quite abstract:--A = A, _ergo_, I = I, and so forth. Taken in an abstract sense, the Object is at once posited with the Subject. For to be Subject means, to know; and to know means, to have representations. Object and representation are one and the same thing. In the "Fourfold Root," therefore, I have divided all objects or representations into four classes, within which the Principle of Sufficient Reason always reigns, though in each class under a different form; nevertheless, the Principle of Sufficient Reason always presupposes the class itself, and indeed, properly speaking, they coincide.[8] Now, in reality, the existence of the Subject of knowing is not an abstract existence. The Subject does not exist for itself and independently, as if it had dropped from the sky; it appears as the instrument of some individual phenomenon of the Will (animal, human being), whose purposes it is destined to serve, and which thereby now receives a consciousness, on the one hand, of itself, on the other hand, of everything else. The question next arises, as to how or out of what _elements_ the representation of the outer world is brought about within this consciousness. This I have already answered in my "Theory of Colours" and also in my chief work,[9] but most thoroughly and exhaustively of all in the Second Edition of the "Fourfold Root," § 21, where it is shown, that all those elements are of _subjective_ origin; wherefore attention is especially drawn to the great difference between all this and Fichte's humbug. For the whole of my exposition is but the full carrying out of Kant's Transcendental Idealism."[10] [8] See "Die Welt a. W. u. V.," vol. ii. pp. 17-21, and vol. i. p. 39 of the second edition. (The passages referred to by Schopenhauer in the second edition are in the third edition vol. ii. pp. 18-21, and vol. i. p. 40). [9] Die Welt a. W. u. V., vol. i. p. 22 _et seqq._, and vol. ii. chap. ii. of the second edition; vol. i. p. 22, § 6, and vol. ii. chap. ii. of the third edition.