On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition)
Schopenhauer · en
When I wrote this (1835) I was still _naïf_ enough seriously to believe
that Brandis was unacquainted with my work, or I should not allude
here to his writings; for they would then be merely a repetition,
application and carrying out of my own doctrine on this point, not a
corroboration of it. But I thought I might safely assume that he did
not know me, because he has not mentioned me anywhere and because if
he had known me, literary honesty would have made it his imperative
duty not to remain silent concerning the man from whom he had borrowed
his chief fundamental thought, the more so as he saw that man then
enduring unmerited neglect, by his writings being generally ignored--a
circumstance which might be construed as favourable to fraud. Add
to this, that it lay in Brandis' own interest as a writer, and would
therefore have shown sagacity on his part, to have appealed to me as
an authority. For the fundamental doctrine propounded by him is so
striking and paradoxical, that even his Göttingen reviewer is amazed
and hardly knows what to think of it; yet such a doctrine as this was
left without foundation either through proof or induction, nor did
Dr. Brandis establish its relation to the whole of our knowledge of
Nature: he simply asserted it. I imagined therefore that it was by the
peculiar gift of divination, which enables eminent physicians to see
and do the right thing in cases of illness, that he had been led to
this view, without being able to give a strict and methodical account
of the grounds of this really metaphysical truth, although he must have
seen how greatly it is opposed to the generally received views. Had he,
thought I, been acquainted with my philosophy, which gives far greater
extension to this truth, makes it valid for the whole of Nature and
founds it both by proof and induction in close connection with Kant's
teaching, from which it proceeds as a final result of excogitation--how
gladly must he have availed himself of such confirmation and support,
rather than to stand alone by an unheard-of assertion which was never
further carried out and, with him, never went beyond bare assertion.
Such were the reasons that led me to believe myself entitled to take
for granted Dr. Brandis' ignorance of my book.