On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition)
Schopenhauer · en
Sextus Empiricus presents another forcible instance of the way in which
the Ancients were wont universally to confound the logical law of the
reason of knowledge with the transcendental law of cause and effect
in Nature, persistently mistaking one for the other. In the 9th Book
"Adversus Mathematicos," that is, the Book "Adversus Physicos," § 204,
he undertakes to prove the law of causality, and says: "He who asserts
that there is no cause (αἰτία), either has no cause (αἰτία) for his
assertion, or has one. In the former case there is not more truth in
his assertion than in its contradiction; in the latter, his assertion
itself proves the existence of a cause."
By this we see that the Ancients had not yet arrived at a clear
distinction between requiring a reason as the ground of a conclusion,
and asking for a cause for the occurrence of a real event. As for the
Scholastic Philosophers of later times, the law of causality was in
their eyes an axiom above investigation: "_non inquirimus an causa sit,
quia nihil est per se notius_," says Suarez.[25] At the same time they
held fast to the above quoted Aristotelian classification; but, as far
as I know at least, they equally failed to arrive at a clear idea of
the necessary distinction of which we are here speaking.
[25] Suarez, "Disp." 12, sect. 1.
§ 7. _Descartes._
For we find even the excellent Descartes, who gave the first impulse
to subjective reflection and thereby became the father of modern
philosophy, still entangled in confusions for which it is difficult
to account; and we shall soon see to what serious and deplorable
consequences these confusions have led with regard to Metaphysics.
In the "_Responsio ad secundas objectiones in meditationes de prima
philosophia_," _axioma i._ he says: _Nulla res existit, de qua non
possit quæri, quænam sit causa, cur existat. Hoc enim de ipso Deo quæri
potest, non quod indigeat ulla causa ut existat, sed quia ipsa ejus
naturæ immensitas est_ CAUSA, SIVE RATIO, _propter quam nulla causa
indiget ad existendum_. He ought to have said: The immensity of God
is a logical reason from which it follows, that God needs no cause;
whereas he confounds the two together and obviously has no clear
consciousness of the difference between reason and cause. Properly
speaking however, it is his intention which mars his insight. For
here, where the law of causality demands a _cause_, he substitutes a
_reason_ instead of it, because the latter, unlike the former, does
not immediately lead to something beyond it; and thus, by means of
this very axiom, he clears the way to the _Ontological Proof_ of
the existence of God, which was really his invention, for Anselm
had only indicated it in a general manner. Immediately after these
axioms, of which I have just quoted the first, there comes a formal,
quite serious statement of the Ontological Proof, which, in fact,
already lies within that axiom, as the chicken does within the egg
that has been long brooded over.