than the direction of the burning-glass towards the object; but this might have taken place after the removal of the cloud and the addition of oxygen might have occurred later still: in this respect therefore it is the accidental order of things that determines which is the cause. On closer inspection, however, we find that it is _the entire state_ which is the cause of the ensuing one, so that the chronological order in which its single conditions were brought about, is in all essential respects indifferent. With reference to a given case therefore, the last occurring condition of a state may be called the cause κατ' ἐξοχήν, because it completes the measure of the necessary conditions, and its appearance thus becomes the decisive change. For purposes of general consideration, however, it is only the _entire_ state which, by bringing about its successor, can be regarded as the cause. The single requisites which, added together, complete and constitute the cause may be called causal elements (_ursächliche Momente_) or even _conditions_, and into these accordingly the cause may be subdivided. On the other hand, it is quite wrong to call the objects themselves causes, instead of the states: some would, for instance, call the burning-glass in the above example the cause of the ignition; while others, again, would call the cloud the cause; others the sun or the oxygen, and so on arbitrarily and without order. But it is absurd to call an object the cause of another object; first of all, because objects not only contain form and quality, but _Matter_ also, which has neither beginning or end; secondly, because the law of causality refers exclusively to _changes_, _i.e._ to the entrance and exit of states in Time, wherein it regulates that special relation, in reference to which the earlier state is called _cause_, the later _effect_, and the necessary connection between both, the _resulting_ of the one from the other. I here refer the thoughtful reader to the explanations I have given in my chief work.[60] For it is of the highest importance that our conception of the true and proper meaning of the law of causality and the sphere of its validity should be perfectly clear and definite: before all things, that we should recognize, that this law refers solely and exclusively to _changes_ of material states and to nothing else whatever; consequently, that it ought not to be brought in when _these_ are not in question. The law of causality is the regulator of the _changes_ undergone in Time by objects of our outer _experience_; but these objects are all material. Each change can only be brought about by another having preceded it, which is determined by a rule, and then the new change takes place as being necessarily induced by the preceding one. This necessity is the causal nexus. [60] "Die Welt a. W. u. V." vol. ii. chap. 4, especially p. 42 and _seq._ of the 2nd edition; p. 46 _seq._ of the 3rd edition.