On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition)
Schopenhauer · en
Now, that it should be so, follows necessarily from the intellectual
character of perception. All animals, even down to the very lowest,
must have Understanding--that is, knowledge of the causal law,
although they have it in very different degrees of delicacy and of
clearness; at any rate they must have as much of it as is required
for perception by their senses; for sensation without Understanding
would be not only a useless, but a cruel gift of Nature. No one, who
has himself any intelligence, can doubt the existence of it in the
higher animals. But at times it even becomes undeniably evident that
their knowledge of causality is actually _à priori_, and that it does
not arise from the habit of seeing one thing follow upon another. A
very young puppy will not, for instance, jump off a table, because
he foresees what would be the consequence. Not long ago I had some
large curtains put up at my bed-room window, which reached down to the
floor, and were drawn aside from the centre by means of a string. The
first morning they were opened I was surprised to see my dog, a very
intelligent poodle, standing quite perplexed, and looking upwards and
sidewards for the cause of the phenomenon: that is, he was seeking
for the change which he knew _à priori_ must have taken place. Next
day the same thing happened again.--But even the lowest animals have
perception--consequently Understanding--down to the aquatic polypus,
which has no distinct organs of sensation, yet wanders from leaf to
leaf on its waterplant, while clinging to it with its feelers, in
search of more light.