The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
But time and space, each for itself, can be mentally presented apart from
matter, whereas matter cannot be so presented apart from time and space.
The form which is inseparable from it presupposes space, and the action in
which its very existence consists, always imports some change, in other
words a determination in time. But space and time are not only, each for
itself, presupposed by matter, but a union of the two constitutes its
essence, for this, as we have seen, consists in action, _i.e._, in
causation. All the innumerable conceivable phenomena and conditions of
things, might be coexistent in boundless space, without limiting each
other, or might be successive in endless time without interfering with
each other: thus a necessary relation of these phenomena to each other,
and a law which should regulate them according to such a relation, is by
no means needful, would not, indeed, be applicable: it therefore follows
that in the case of all co-existence in space and change in time, so long
as each of these forms preserves for itself its condition and its course
without any connection with the other, there can be no causation, and
since causation constitutes the essential nature of matter, there can be
no matter. But the law of causation receives its meaning and necessity
only from this, that the essence of change does not consist simply in the
mere variation of things, but rather in the fact that at the _same part of
space_ there is now _one thing_ and then _another_, and at _one_ and the
same point of time there is _here_ one thing and there _another_: only
this reciprocal limitation of space and time by each other gives meaning,
and at the same time necessity, to a law, according to which change must
take place. What is determined by the law of causality is therefore not
merely a succession of things in time, but this succession with reference
to a definite space, and not merely existence of things in a particular
place, but in this place at a different point of time. Change, _i.e._,
variation which takes place according to the law of causality, implies
always a determined part of space and a determined part of time together
and in union. Thus causality unites space with time. But we found that the
whole essence of matter consisted in action, _i.e._, in causation,
consequently space and time must also be united in matter, that is to say,
matter must take to itself at once the distinguishing qualities both of
space and time, however much these may be opposed to each other, and must
unite in itself what is impossible for each of these independently, that
is, the fleeting course of time, with the rigid unchangeable perduration
of space: infinite divisibility it receives from both. It is for this
reason that we find that co-existence, which could neither be in time
alone, for time has no contiguity, nor in space alone, for space has no
before, after, or now, is first established through matter. But the