The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
It is self-evident that under these circumstances no other advice can be
given as to how one may enter into the thought explained in this work than
_to read the book twice_, and the first time with great patience, a
patience which is only to be derived from the belief, voluntarily
accorded, that the beginning presupposes the end almost as much as the end
presupposes the beginning, and that all the earlier parts presuppose the
later almost as much as the later presuppose the earlier. I say “almost;”
for this is by no means absolutely the case, and I have honestly and
conscientiously done all that was possible to give priority to that which
stands least in need of explanation from what follows, as indeed generally
to everything that can help to make the thought as easy to comprehend and
as distinct as possible. This might indeed to a certain extent be achieved
if it were not that the reader, as is very natural, thinks, as he reads,
not merely of what is actually said, but also of its possible
consequences, and thus besides the many contradictions actually given of
the opinions of the time, and presumably of the reader, there may be added
as many more which are anticipated and imaginary. That, then, which is
really only misunderstanding, must take the form of active disapproval,
and it is all the more difficult to recognise that it is misunderstanding,
because although the laboriously-attained clearness of the explanation and
distinctness of the expression never leaves the immediate sense of what is
said doubtful, it cannot at the same time express its relations to all
that remains to be said. Therefore, as we have said, the first perusal
demands patience, founded on confidence that on a second perusal much, or
all, will appear in an entirely different light. Further, the earnest
endeavour to be more completely and even more easily comprehended in the
case of a very difficult subject, must justify occasional repetition.
Indeed the structure of the whole, which is organic, not a mere chain,
makes it necessary sometimes to touch on the same point twice. Moreover
this construction, and the very close connection of all the parts, has not
left open to me the division into chapters and paragraphs which I should
otherwise have regarded as very important, but has obliged me to rest
satisfied with four principal divisions, as it were four aspects of one
thought. In each of these four books it is especially important to guard
against losing sight, in the details which must necessarily be discussed,
of the principal thought to which they belong, and the progress of the
whole exposition. I have thus expressed the first, and like those which
follow, unavoidable demand upon the reader, who holds the philosopher in
small favour just because he himself is a philosopher.