The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
Thus between desiring and attaining all human life flows on throughout.
The wish is, in its nature, pain; the attainment soon begets satiety: the
end was only apparent; possession takes away the charm; the wish, the
need, presents itself under a new form; when it does not, then follows
desolateness, emptiness, ennui, against which the conflict is just as
painful as against want. That wish and satisfaction should follow each
other neither too quickly nor too slowly reduces the suffering, which both
occasion to the smallest amount, and constitutes the happiest life. For
that which we might otherwise call the most beautiful part of life, its
purest joy, if it were only because it lifts us out of real existence and
transforms us into disinterested spectators of it—that is, pure knowledge,
which is foreign to all willing, the pleasure of the beautiful, the true
delight in art—this is granted only to a very few, because it demands rare
talents, and to these few only as a passing dream. And then, even these
few, on account of their higher intellectual power, are made susceptible
of far greater suffering than duller minds can ever feel, and are also
placed in lonely isolation by a nature which is obviously different from
that of others; thus here also accounts are squared. But to the great
majority of men purely intellectual pleasures are not accessible. They are
almost quite incapable of the joys which lie in pure knowledge. They are
entirely given up to willing. If, therefore, anything is to win their
sympathy, to be _interesting_ to them, it must (as is implied in the
meaning of the word) in some way excite their _will_, even if it is only
through a distant and merely problematical relation to it; the will must
not be left altogether out of the question, for their existence lies far
more in willing than in knowing,—action and reaction is their one element.
We may find in trifles and everyday occurrences the naïve expressions of
this quality. Thus, for example, at any place worth seeing they may visit,
they write their names, in order thus to react, to affect the place since
it does not affect them. Again, when they see a strange rare animal, they
cannot easily confine themselves to merely observing it; they must rouse
it, tease it, play with it, merely to experience action and reaction; but
this need for excitement of the will manifests itself very specially in
the discovery and support of card-playing, which is quite peculiarly the
expression of the miserable side of humanity.