The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
Every science must start from two principal data. One of these is always
the principle of sufficient reason in some form or another, as organon;
the other is its special object as problem. Thus, for example, geometry
has space as problem, and the ground of existence in space as organon.
Arithmetic has time as problem, and the ground of existence in time as
organon. Logic has the combination of concepts as such as problem, and the
ground of knowledge as organon. History has the past acts of men treated
as a whole as problem, and the law of human motives as organon. Natural
science has matter as problem, and the law of causality as organon. Its
end and aim is therefore, by the guidance of causality, to refer all
possible states of matter to other states, and ultimately to one single
state; and again to deduce these states from each other, and ultimately
from one single state. Thus two states of matter stand over against each
other in natural science as extremes: that state in which matter is
furthest from being the immediate object of the subject, and that state in
which it is most completely such an immediate object, _i.e._, the most
dead and crude matter, the primary element, as the one extreme, and the
human organism as the other. Natural science as chemistry seeks for the
first, as physiology for the second. But as yet neither extreme has been
reached, and it is only in the intermediate ground that something has been
won. The prospect is indeed somewhat hopeless. The chemists, under the
presupposition that the qualitative division of matter is not, like
quantitative division, an endless process, are always trying to decrease
the number of the elements, of which there are still about sixty; and if
they were to succeed in reducing them to two, they would still try to find
the common root of these. For, on the one hand, the law of homogeneity
leads to the assumption of a primary chemical state of matter, which alone
belongs to matter as such, and precedes all others which are not
essentially matter as such, but merely contingent forms and qualities. On
the other hand, we cannot understand how this one state could ever
experience a chemical change, if there did not exist a second state to
affect it. Thus the same difficulty appears in chemistry which Epicurus
met with in mechanics. For he had to show how the first atom departed from
the original direction of its motion. Indeed this contradiction, which
develops entirely of itself and can neither be escaped nor solved, might
quite properly be set up as a chemical _antinomy_. Thus an antinomy
appears in the one extreme of natural science, and a corresponding one
will appear in the other. There is just as little hope of reaching this
opposite extreme of natural science, for we see ever more clearly that
what is chemical can never be referred to what is mechanical, nor what is
organic to what is chemical or electrical. Those who in our own day are