The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
presents itself to us here, finds its solution in the fact that, to use
Kant’s phraseology, time, space, and causality do not belong to the
thing-in-itself, but only to its phenomena, of which they are the form;
which in my language means this: The objective world, the world as idea,
is not the only side of the world, but merely its outward side; and it has
an entirely different side—the side of its inmost nature—its kernel—the
thing-in-itself. This we shall consider in the second book, calling it
after the most immediate of its objective manifestations—will. But the
world as idea, with which alone we are here concerned, only appears with
the opening of the first eye. Without this medium of knowledge it cannot
be, and therefore it was not before it. But without that eye, that is to
say, outside of knowledge, there was also no before, no time. Thus time
has no beginning, but all beginning is in time. Since, however, it is the
most universal form of the knowable, in which all phenomena are united
together through causality, time, with its infinity of past and future, is
present in the beginning of knowledge. The phenomenon which fills the
first present must at once be known as causally bound up with and
dependent upon a sequence of phenomena which stretches infinitely into the
past, and this past itself is just as truly conditioned by this first
present, as conversely the present is by the past. Accordingly the past
out of which the first present arises, is, like it, dependent upon the
knowing subject, without which it is nothing. It necessarily happens,
however, that this first present does not manifest itself as the first,
that is, as having no past for its parent, but as being the beginning of
time. It manifests itself rather as the consequence of the past, according
to the principle of existence in time. In the same way, the phenomena
which fill this first present appear as the effects of earlier phenomena
which filled the past, in accordance with the law of causality. Those who
like mythological interpretations may take the birth of Kronos (χρονος),
the youngest of the Titans, as a symbol of the moment here referred to at
which time appears, though, indeed it has no beginning; for with him,
since he ate his father, the crude productions of heaven and earth cease,
and the races of gods and men appear upon the scene.
This explanation at which we have arrived by following the most consistent
of the philosophical systems which start from the object, materialism, has
brought out clearly the inseparable and reciprocal dependence of subject
and object, and at the same time the inevitable antithesis between them.
And this knowledge leads us to seek for the inner nature of the world, the
thing-in-itself, not in either of the two elements of the idea, but in
something quite distinct from it, and which is not encumbered with such a
fundamental and insoluble antithesis.