The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
Besides the ideas we have as yet considered, which, according to their
construction, could be referred to time, space, and matter, if we consider
them with reference to the object, or to pure sensibility and
understanding (_i.e._, knowledge of causality), if we consider them with
reference to the subject, another faculty of knowledge has appeared in man
alone of all earthly creatures, an entirely new consciousness, which, with
very appropriate and significant exactness, is called _reflection_. For it
is in fact derived from the knowledge of perception, and is a reflected
appearance of it. But it has assumed a nature fundamentally different. The
forms of perception do not affect it, and even the principle of sufficient
reason which reigns over all objects has an entirely different aspect with
regard to it. It is just this new, more highly endowed, consciousness,
this abstract reflex of all that belongs to perception in that conception
of the reason which has nothing to do with perception, that gives to man
that thoughtfulness which distinguishes his consciousness so entirely from
that of the lower animals, and through which his whole behaviour upon
earth is so different from that of his irrational fellow-creatures. He far
surpasses them in power and also in suffering. They live in the present
alone, he lives also in the future and the past. They satisfy the needs of
the moment, he provides by the most ingenious preparations for the future,
yea for days that he shall never see. They are entirely dependent on the
impression of the moment, on the effect of the perceptible motive; he is
determined by abstract conceptions independent of the present. Therefore
he follows predetermined plans, he acts from maxims, without reference to
his surroundings or the accidental impression of the moment. Thus, for
example, he can make with composure deliberate preparations for his own
death, he can dissemble past finding out, and can carry his secret with
him to the grave; lastly, he has an actual choice between several motives;
for only in the abstract can such motives, present together in
consciousness, afford the knowledge with regard to themselves, that the
one excludes the other, and can thus measure themselves against each other
with reference to their power over the will. The motive that overcomes, in
that it decides the question at issue, is the deliberate determinant of
the will, and is a sure indication of its character. The brute, on the
other hand, is determined by the present impression; only the fear of
present compulsion can constrain its desires, until at last this fear has
become custom, and as such continues to determine it; this is called
training. The brute feels and perceives; man, in addition to this,
_thinks_ and _knows_: both _will_. The brute expresses its feelings and
dispositions by gestures and sounds; man communicates his thought to
others, or, if he wishes, he conceals it, by means of speech. Speech is