The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
referred these manifold expressions of reason to one simple function which
would be recognised in them all, from which they would all be explained,
and which would therefore constitute the real inner nature of reason. It
is true that the excellent Locke in the “Essay on the Human Understanding”
(Book II., ch. xi., §§ 10 and 11), very rightly refers to general concepts
as the characteristic which distinguishes man from the brutes, and
Leibnitz quotes this with full approval in the “Nouveaux Essais sur
l’Entendement Humaine” (Book II., ch. xi., §§ 10 and 11.) But when Locke
(in Book IV., ch. xvii., §§ 2 and 3) comes to the special explanation of
reason he entirely loses sight of this simple, primary characteristic, and
he also falls into a wavering, undetermined, incomplete account of mangled
and derivative manifestations of it. Leibnitz also, in the corresponding
part of his work, behaves in a similar manner, only with more confusion
and indistinctness. In the Appendix, I have fully considered how Kant
confused and falsified the conception of the nature of reason. But whoever
will take the trouble to go through in this reference the mass of
philosophical writing which has appeared since Kant, will find out, that
just as the faults of princes must be expiated by whole nations, the
errors of great minds extend their influence over whole generations, and
even over centuries; they grow and propagate themselves, and finally
degenerate into monstrosities. All this arises from the fact that, as
Berkeley says, “Few men think; yet all will have opinions.”
The understanding has only one function—immediate knowledge of the
relation of cause and effect. Yet the perception of the real world, and
all common sense, sagacity, and inventiveness, however multifarious their
applications may be, are quite clearly seen to be nothing more than
manifestations of that one function. So also the reason has one function;
and from it all the manifestations of reason we have mentioned, which
distinguish the life of man from that of the brutes, may easily be
explained. The application or the non-application of this function is all
that is meant by what men have everywhere and always called rational and
irrational.(12)