The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
Not to my contemporaries, not to my compatriots—to mankind I commit my now
completed work in the confidence that it will not be without value for
them, even if this should be late recognised, as is commonly the lot of
what is good. For it cannot have been for the passing generation,
engrossed with the delusion of the moment, that my mind, almost against my
will, has uninterruptedly stuck to its work through the course of a long
life. And while the lapse of time has not been able to make me doubt the
worth of my work, neither has the lack of sympathy; for I constantly saw
the false and the bad, and finally the absurd and senseless,(2) stand in
universal admiration and honour, and I bethought myself that if it were
not the case those who are capable of recognising the genuine and right
are so rare that we may look for them in vain for some twenty years, then
those who are capable of producing it could not be so few that their works
afterwards form an exception to the perishableness of earthly things; and
thus would be lost the reviving prospect of posterity which every one who
sets before himself a high aim requires to strengthen him.
Whoever seriously takes up and pursues an object that does not lead to
material advantages, must not count on the sympathy of his contemporaries.
For the most part he will see, however, that in the meantime the
superficial aspect of that object becomes current in the world, and enjoys
its day; and this is as it should be. The object itself must be pursued
for its own sake, otherwise it cannot be attained; for any design or
intention is always dangerous to insight. Accordingly, as the whole
history of literature proves, everything of real value required a long
time to gain acceptance, especially if it belonged to the class of
instructive, not entertaining, works; and meanwhile the false flourished.
For to combine the object with its superficial appearance is difficult,
when it is not impossible. Indeed that is just the curse of this world of
want and need, that everything must serve and slave for these; and
therefore it is not so constituted that any noble and sublime effort, like
the endeavour after light and truth, can prosper unhindered and exist for
its own sake. But even if such an endeavour has once succeeded in
asserting itself, and the conception of it has thus been introduced,
material interests and personal aims will immediately take possession of
it, in order to make it their tool or their mask. Accordingly, when Kant
brought philosophy again into repute, it had soon to become the tool of
political aims from above, and personal aims from below; although,
strictly speaking, not philosophy itself, but its ghost, that passes for
it. This should not really astonish us; for the incredibly large majority
of men are by nature quite incapable of any but material aims, indeed they
can conceive no others. Thus the pursuit of truth alone is far too lofty