material as the above-mentioned--_Grundlegung_; only the latter has a more concise and rigorous form, while in the former the subject is handled with greater prolixity, interspersed with digressions and even padded with some pieces of moral rhetoric, to heighten the impression. When Kant wrote it, he had at last, and late in life, become deservedly famous; hence, being certain of boundless attention, he allowed greater play to the garrulity of old age. But the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_ contains two sections which are peculiar to itself. First: the exposition of the relation between Freedom and Necessity (pp. 169-179 of the fourth edition, and pp. 223-231 in Rosenkranz). This passage is above all praise, and undoubtedly was framed earlier in his life, as it is entirely in harmony with his treatment of the same subject in the _Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_ (pp. 560-586; Rosenkranz, p. 438, sqq.). And secondly: the _Moraltheologie_, which will more and more come to be recognised as the real object Kant had in view. In his _Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre_ this _pendant_ to the deplorable _Rechtslehre_, written in 1797, the debility of old age is at length fully pre-ponderant. For all these reasons the present criticism will mainly deal with the treatise first mentioned, _viz.,_ the _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_, and the reader will please understand that all the page numbers given by themselves refer to it. Both the other works will only be considered as accessory and secondary. For a proper comprehension of the present criticism, which, in probing the Kantian Ethics to its depths, bears directly and principally on this _Grundlegung_, it is very desirable that the latter be carefully read through again, so that the mind may have a perfectly clear and fresh presentment of what it contains. It is but a matter of 128 and xiv pages (in Rosenkranz only 100 pages altogether). I shall quote from the third edition of 1792, adding the page number of the new complete publication by Rosenkranz, with an R. prefixed. [1] For a complete demonstration v. _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, Vol. I., § 16, p. 103, sqq., and Vol. II., Chap. 16, p. 166, sqq. of the third edition. _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, that is, _The World as Will and Idea_; "Idea" being used much as _εἵδωλον_ sometimes is (cf. Xen. _Sym.,_ 4, 21), in the sense of "an image in the mind," "a mental picture."--(_Translator_.) [2] It seems better to keep this technical word than to attempt a cumbrous periphrasis. The meaning is perfectly clear. The _sensibilia_ (_phaenomena_) are opposed to the _intelligibilia_ (_noumena_), which compose the transcendental world. So the individual, in so far as he is a phaenomenon, has an empirical character; in so far as he is a noumenôn, his character is intelligible (_intelligibilis_). The _mundus intelligibilis,_ or _mundus noumenôn_ is the _κόσμος νοητὸς_ of New Platonism.--(_Translator_.)