Ethics was of course frequently put in the imperative form, and treated as a doctrine of duties also in pre-Kantian philosophy; but it was always then based upon the will of a God whose existence had been otherwise proved, and so there was no inconsequence. As soon, however, as the attempt was made, as Kant attempted, to give a foundation to Ethics independent of this will, and establish it without metaphysical hypotheses, there was no longer any justification for taking as its basis the words "thou shalt," and "it is thy duty" (that is, the imperative form), without first deducing the truth thereof from some other source. [1] Du sollt (_sic_) nicht lügen. [2] Sollt is the old form for "_sollst_." Cf. Eng., _shalt_: Icel; _skalt_--(_Translator_.) [3] A contradiction in the adjective. This occurs when the epithet applied to a noun contradicts its essential meaning.--(_Translator_.) [4] Like the converse of a geometrical proposition, this Kantian inversion is not necessarily true; its validity, in fact, depends on the conclusion being implicitly contained in the hypothesis. --(_Translator_.) CHAPTER III. ON THE ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES TOWARDS OURSELVES IN PARTICULAR. This form of the doctrine of duties was very acceptable to Kant, and in working out his position he left it untouched; for, like his predecessors, along with the duties towards others he ranged also duties towards ourselves. I, however, entirely reject this assumption, and, as there will be no better opportunity, I shall here incidentally explain my view.