But the first reason stated is of a different kind, and affords as neat an instance of self-stultification proceeding _ex cathedra_ as can well be found. It is true that the question is worded vaguely enough, but if it means anything, it asks where the "_philosophiae moralis fons et fundamentum_"--the foundation of moral science--is to be sought for, _i.e._, where it is to be found. Turning to the Judgment we read: "He" (Schopenhauer) "has omitted to deal with the essential part of the question, apparently thinking that he was required to establish some fundamental principle of Ethics": which he was required to do, unless the Society's Latin is borrowed from _Νεϕαλοκοκκυγία._ And then it goes on to declare that he treated as secondary, indeed as an _opus supererogationis,_ the very thing which the Academy intended should occupy the first place, namely, the connection between Metaphysics and Ethics.[2] But the "_metaphysicae et ethicae nexus_," so far from being formulated in the question as the chief point to be considered, is not even mentioned! The Society thus denies having asked what it actually did ask, while the discussion, which it asserts was specially indicated, is not suggested by a single word. Its embarrassment is sufficiently shown by this unworthy shifting, to enlarge upon which would here be out of place.[3] It is not intended to offer any criticism either on Schopenhauer's main position in this essay, or on the various side-issues involved. The reader is supposed to be accurately acquainted with the fundamentals of his philosophy, as contained in _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, and is invited to be the critic himself. But perhaps a few remarks on the structure and general trend of the work may not be amiss. After preliminary considerations, partly to show the difficulty of the subject, partly to clear the ground (Part I.), the treatise opens with a searching critique of Kant's Ethical Basis, of the Leading Principle of his system, and of its derived forms. (Part II., Chapters I.-VI.)[4] Schopenhauer's conclusion is that the Categorical Imperative is a very cleverly woven web, yet in reality nothing but the old theological basis in disguise, the latter being the indispensable, if invisible, clothes' peg for the former; and that Kant's _tour de main_ of deducing his Moral Theology from Ethics is like inverting a pyramid. The theory of Conscience is next discussed (Chapter VII.). The half-supernatural element which Kant introduced under the highly dramatic form of a court of justice holding secret session in the breast, is examined, and eliminated; and Conscience is defined as the knowledge that we have of ourselves through our acts.