Furthermore, on p. 13 (R., p. 19), in accordance with the above view, we find that the moral worth of an action is supposed to lie, by no means in the =intention= which led to it, but in the maxim which was followed. Whereas I, on the contrary, ask the reader to reflect that it is the =intention alone= which decides as to the moral worth, or worthlessness, off an action, so that the same act may deserve condemnation or praise according to the intention which determined it. Hence it is that, whenever men discuss a proceeding to which some moral importance is attached, the =intention= is always investigated, and by this standard alone the matter is judged; as, likewise, it is in the _intention_ alone that every one seeks justification, if he see his conduct misinterpreted or excuse, if its consequence be mischievous. On p. 14 (R., p. 20) we at last reach the definition of Duty, which is the fundamental conception of Kant's entire ethical system. It is: "The necessity of an action out of respect for the law." But what is =necessary= takes place with absolute certainty while conduct based on pure duty generally does not come off at all. And not only this; Kant himself admits (p. 25; R., p. 28) that there are =no certain instances= on record of conduct determined solely by pure duty; and on p. 26 (R., p. 29) he says: "It is utterly impossible to know with certainty from experience whether there has ever really been one single case in which an action, however true to duty, has rested simply on its idea."--And similarly on p. 28 (R., p. 30) and p. 49 (R., p. 50). In what sense then can =necessity= be attributed to such an action? As it is only fair always to put the most favourable interpretation on an author's words, we will suppose him to mean that an act true to duty is =objectively= necessary, but =subjectively= accidental. Only it is precisely this that is more easily said than thought for where is the =Object= of this =objective= necessity, the consequence of which for the most part, perhaps indeed always, fails to be realised in objective reality! With every wish to be unbiassed, I cannot but think that the expression--=necessity of an action=--is nothing but an artificially concealed, very forced paraphrase of the word "ought."[3] This will become clearer if we notice that in the same definition the word _Achtung_ (respect) is employed, where _Gehorsam_ (obedience) is meant. Similarly in the note on p. 16 (R., p. 20) we read: "_Achtung_ signifies simply the subordination of my will to a law. The direct determination of the will by a law, and the consciousness that it is so determined--this is what is denoted by _Achtung_" In what language? In German the proper term is _Gehorsam_. But the word _Achtung_, so unsuitable as it is, cannot without a reason have been put in place of the word _Gehorsam._ It must serve some purpose; and this is obviously none other than to veil the derivation of the imperative form, and of