This is the indispensable key to the direction in which Kant's leading principle of Ethics is embedded; nor can he help supplying it himself. Only he refrains from doing so at the moment of propounding his precept, lest we should feel shocked. It is found further on in the text, at a decent distance, so as to prevent the fact at once leaping to light, that here, after all, in spite of his grand _a priori_ edifice, =Egoism= is sitting on the judge's seat, scales in hand. Moreover, it does not occur, till after he has decided, from the point of view of the _eventualiter_ passive side, that this position holds good for the active _rôle_ as well. Thus, on p. 19 (R., p. 24) we read: "That I could not =wish= for a general law to establish lying, because people would no longer believe me, or else pay me back in the =same coin=." Again on p. 55 (R., p. 49): "The universality of a law to the effect that every one could promise what he likes, without any intention of keeping his word, would make the promise itself, together with the object in view, whatever that might be, impossible; for no one would =believe= it." On p. 56 (R., p. 50), in connection with the maxim of =hard-heartedness=, we find the following: "A will, which should determine this, would contradict itself; for cases can occur, in which a man needs the love and sympathy of others, and in which he, by virtue of such a natural law, evolved from his own will, would deprive himself of all hope of the help, which he desires." Similarly in the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_ (Part I., vol. i., chap. 2, p. 123; R., p. 192): "If every one were to regard others' distress with total indifference, and you were to belong to such an order of things; would you be there with the concurrence of your will?" _Quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam_![1] one could reply. These passages sufficiently show in what sense the phrase, "to be able to wish," in Kant's formula is to be understood. But it is in the _Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre_, that this real nature of his ethical principle is most clearly stated. In § 30 we read: "For every one wishes to be helped. If, however, a man were to give utterance to his rule of unwillingness to help others, all people would be justified in refusing him assistance. Thus this rule of selfishness contradicts itself." =Would be justified=, he says, =would be justified=! Here, then, it is declared, as explicitly as anything can be, that moral obligation rests solely and entirely on presupposed =reciprocity=; consequently it is utterly selfish, and only admits of being interpreted by egoism, which, under the condition of =reciprocity=, knows how to make a compromise cleverly enough. Such a course would be quite in place if it were a question of laying down the fundamentals of state-organisation, but not, when we come to construct those of ethics. In the _Grundlegung_, p. 81 (R., p. 67), the following sentence occurs: "The principle of