The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 1 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 1 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
even to the exceptions, a literature in which the art of combining lofty
words with paltry significance has reached its height. I can certainly
never escape from the errors and weaknesses which, in my case as in every
one else’s, necessarily belong to my nature; but I will not increase them
by unworthy accommodations.
As regards this second edition, first of all I am glad to say that after
five and twenty years I find nothing to retract; so that my fundamental
convictions have only been confirmed, as far as concerns myself at least.
The alterations in the first volume therefore, which contains the whole
text of the first edition, nowhere touch what is essential. Sometimes they
concern things of merely secondary importance, and more often consist of
very short explanatory additions inserted here and there. Only the
criticism of the Kantian philosophy has received important corrections and
large additions, for these could not be put into a supplementary book,
such as those which are given in the second volume, and which correspond
to each of the four books that contain the exposition of my own doctrine.
In the case of the latter, I have chosen this form of enlarging and
improving them, because the five and twenty years that have passed since
they were composed have produced so marked a change in my method of
exposition and in my style, that it would not have done to combine the
content of the second volume with that of the first, as both must have
suffered by the fusion. I therefore give both works separately, and in the
earlier exposition, even in many places where I would now express myself
quite differently, I have changed nothing, because I desired to guard
against spoiling the work of my earlier years through the carping
criticism of age. What in this regard might need correction will correct
itself in the mind of the reader with the help of the second volume. Both
volumes have, in the full sense of the word, a supplementary relation to
each other, so far as this rests on the fact that one age of human life
is, intellectually, the supplement of another. It will therefore be found,
not only that each volume contains what the other lacks, but that the
merits of the one consist peculiarly in that which is wanting in the
other. Thus, if the first half of my work surpasses the second in what can
only be supplied by the fire of youth and the energy of first conceptions,
the second will surpass the first by the ripeness and complete elaboration
of the thought which can only belong to the fruit of the labour of a long
life. For when I had the strength originally to grasp the fundamental
thought of my system, to follow it at once into its four branches, to
return from them to the unity of their origin, and then to explain the
whole distinctly, I could not yet be in a position to work out all the
branches of the system with the fulness, thoroughness, and elaborateness
which is only reached by the meditation of many years—meditation which is