The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 1 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 1 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
necessary relation to each other, rests only in it, is in fact merely
relative; but of this more presently. I have further shown, that the
necessary relation which the principle of sufficient reason expresses
generally, appears in other forms corresponding to the classes into which
objects are divided, according to their possibility; and again that by
these forms the proper division of the classes is tested. I take it for
granted that what I said in this earlier essay is known and present to the
reader, for if it had not been already said it would necessarily find its
place here.
§ 3. The chief distinction among our ideas is that between ideas of
perception and abstract ideas. The latter form just one class of ideas,
namely concepts, and these are the possession of man alone of all
creatures upon earth. The capacity for these, which distinguishes him from
all the lower animals, has always been called reason.(5) We shall consider
these abstract ideas by themselves later, but, in the first place, we
shall speak exclusively of the _ideas of perception_. These comprehend the
whole visible world, or the sum total of experience, with the conditions
of its possibility. We have already observed that it is a highly important
discovery of Kant’s, that these very conditions, these forms of the
visible world, _i.e._, the absolutely universal element in its perception,
the common property of all its phenomena, space and time, even when taken
by themselves and apart from their content, can, not only be thought in
the abstract, but also be directly perceived; and that this perception or
intuition is not some kind of phantasm arising from constant recurrence in
experience, but is so entirely independent of experience that we must
rather regard the latter as dependent on it, inasmuch as the qualities of
space and time, as they are known in _a priori_ perception or intuition,
are valid for all possible experience, as rules to which it must
invariably conform. Accordingly, in my essay on the principle of
sufficient reason, I have treated space and time, because they are
perceived as pure and empty of content, as a special and independent class
of ideas. This quality of the universal forms of intuition, which was
discovered by Kant, that they may be perceived in themselves and apart
from experience, and that they may be known as exhibiting those laws on
which is founded the infallible science of mathematics, is certainly very
important. Not less worthy of remark, however, is this other quality of
time and space, that the principle of sufficient reason, which conditions
experience as the law of causation and of motive, and thought as the law
of the basis of judgment, appears here in quite a special form, to which I
have given the name of the ground of being. In time, this is the
succession of its moments, and in space the position of its parts, which
reciprocally determine each other _ad infinitum_.