The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
Our self-consciousness has not space but only time as its form, and
therefore we do not think in three dimensions, as we perceive, but only in
_one_, thus in a line, without breadth or depth. This is the source of the
greatest of the essential imperfections of our intellect. We can know all
things only in _succession_, and can become conscious of only one at a
time, indeed even of this one only under the condition that for the time
we forget everything else, thus are absolutely unconscious of everything
else, so that for the time it ceases to exist as far as we are concerned.
In respect of this quality our intellect may be compared to a telescope
with a very narrow field of vision; just because our consciousness is not
stationary but fleeting. The intellect apprehends only successively, and
in order to grasp one thing must let another go, retaining nothing but
traces of it, which are ever becoming weaker. The thought which is vividly
present to me now must after a little while have escaped me altogether;
and if a good night’s sleep intervene, it may be that I shall never find
it again, unless it is connected with my personal interests, that is, with
my will, which always commands the field.
Upon this imperfection of the intellect depends the disconnected and often
_fragmentary nature_ of our course of thought, which I have already
touched on at the close of last chapter; and from this again arises the
unavoidable _distraction_ of our thinking. Sometimes external impressions
of sense throng in upon it, disturbing and interrupting it, forcing
different kinds of things upon it every moment; sometimes _one_ thought
draws in _another_ by the bond of association, and is now itself dislodged
by it; sometimes, lastly, the intellect itself is not capable of fixing
itself very long and continuously at a time upon _one_ thought, but as the
eye when it gazes long at one object is soon unable to see it any more
distinctly, because the outlines run into each other and become confused,
until finally all is obscure, so through long-continued reflection upon
one subject our thinking also is gradually confused, becomes dull, and
ends in complete stupor. Therefore after a certain time, which varies with
the individual, we must for the present give up every meditation or
deliberation which has had the fortune to remain undisturbed, but yet has
not been brought to an end, even if it concerns a matter which is most
important and pertinent to us; and we must dismiss from our consciousness
the subject which interests us so much, however heavily our anxiety about
it may weigh upon us, in order to occupy ourselves now with insignificant
and indifferent things. During this time that important subject no longer
exists for us; it is like the heat in cold water, _latent_. If now we
resume it again at another time, we approach it like a new thing, with
which we become acquainted anew, although more quickly, and the agreeable