The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
or disagreeable impression of it is also produced anew upon our will. We
ourselves, however, do not come back quite unchanged. For with the
physical composition of the humours and tension of the nerves, which
constantly changes with the hours, days, and years, our mood and point of
view also changes. Moreover, the different kinds of ideas which have been
there in the meantime have left an echo behind them, the tone of which
influences the ideas which follow. Therefore the same thing appears to us
at different times, in the morning, in the evening, at mid-day, or on
another day, often very different; opposite views of it now press upon
each other and increase our doubt. Hence we speak of sleeping upon a
matter, and for important determinations we demand a long time for
consideration. Now, although this quality of our intellect, as springing
from its weakness, has its evident disadvantages, yet, on the other hand,
it affords the advantage that after the distraction and the physical
change we return to our subject as comparatively new beings, fresh and
strange, and thus are able to see it repeatedly in very different lights.
From all this it is plain that human consciousness and thought is in its
nature necessarily fragmentary, on account of which the theoretical and
practical results which are achieved by piecing together such fragments
are for the most part defective. In this our thinking consciousness is
like a magic lantern, in the focus of which only one picture can appear at
a time, and each, even if it represents the noblest objects, must yet soon
pass away in order to make room for others of a different, and even most
vulgar, description. In practical matters the most important plans and
resolutions are formed in general; but others are subordinated to these as
means to an end, and others again are subordinated to these, and so on
down to the particular case that has to be carried out _in concreto_. They
do not, however, come to be carried out in the order of their dignity, but
while we are occupied with plans which are great and general, we have to
contend with the most trifling details and the cares of the moment. In
this way our consciousness becomes still more desultory. In general,
theoretical occupations of the mind unfit us for practical affairs, and
_vice versâ_.