The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
We may regard as the third the complete overthrow of the Scholastic
philosophy, a name by which I wish here to denote generally the whole
period beginning with Augustine, the Church Father, and ending just before
Kant. For the chief characteristic of Scholasticism is, indeed, that which
is very correctly stated by Tennemann, the guardianship of the prevailing
national religion over philosophy, which had really nothing left for it to
do but to prove and embellish the cardinal dogmas prescribed to it by
religion. The Schoolmen proper, down to Suarez, confess this openly; the
succeeding philosophers do it more unconsciously, or at least unavowedly.
It is held that Scholastic philosophy only extends to about a hundred
years before Descartes, and that then with him there begins an entirely
new epoch of free investigation independent of all positive theological
doctrine. Such investigation, however, is in fact not to be attributed to
Descartes and his successors,(1) but only an appearance of it, and in any
case an effort after it. Descartes was a man of supreme ability, and if we
take account of the age he lived in, he accomplished a great deal. But if
we set aside this consideration and measure him with reference to the
freeing of thought from all fetters and the commencement of a new period
of untrammelled original investigation with which he is credited, we are
obliged to find that with his doubt still wanting in true seriousness, and
therefore surrendering so quickly and so entirely, he has, indeed, the
appearance of wishing to throw off at once all the early implanted
opinions belonging to his age and nation, but does so only apparently and
for a moment, to assume them again immediately and hold them all the more
firmly; and so is it with all his successors down to Kant. Goethe’s lines
are, therefore, very applicable to a free independent thinker of this
kind:
“Saving Thy gracious presence, he to me
A long-legged grasshopper appears to be,
That springing flies, and flying springs,
And in the grass the same old ditty sings.”(2)
Kant had reasons for assuming the air of also intending nothing more. But
the pretended spring, which was permitted because it was known that it
leads back to the grass, this time became a flight, and now those who
remain below can only look after him, and can never catch him again.