The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
intellect? These would only make them useless and unhappy. Therefore
nature has thus gone about the most costly of all her productions in the
least extravagant manner. In order not to judge unfairly one ought also to
settle definitely one’s expectations of the mental achievements of men
generally from this point of view, and to regard, for example, even
learned men, since as a rule they have become so only by the force of
outward circumstances, primarily as men whom nature really intended to be
tillers of the soil; indeed even professors of philosophy ought to be
estimated according to this standard, and then their achievements will be
found to come up to all fair expectations. It is worth noticing that in
the south, where the necessities of life press less severely upon the
human race, and more leisure is allowed, the mental faculties even of the
multitude also become more active and finer. It is physiologically
noteworthy that the preponderance of the mass of the brain over that of
the spinal cord and the nerves, which, according to Sömmerring’s acute
discovery, affords the true and closest measure of the degree of
intelligence both of species of brutes and of individual men, at the same
time increases the direct power of moving, the agility of the limbs;
because, through the great inequality of the relation, the dependence of
all motor nerves upon the brain becomes more decided; and besides this the
cerebellum, which is the primary controller of movements, shares the
qualitative perfection of the cerebrum; thus through both all voluntary
movements gain greater facility, rapidity, and manageableness, and by the
concentration of the starting‐point of all activity that arises which
Lichtenberg praises in Garrick: “that he appeared to be present in all the
muscles of his body.” Hence clumsiness in the movement of the body
indicates clumsiness in the movement of the thoughts, and will be regarded
as a sign of stupidity both in individuals and nations, as much as
sleepiness of the countenance and vacancy of the glance. Another symptom
of the physiological state of the case referred to is the fact that many
persons are obliged at once to stand still whenever their conversation
with any one who is walking with them begins to gain some connection;
because their brain, as soon as it has to link together a few thoughts,
has no longer as much power over as is required to keep the limbs in
motion by means of the motory nerves, so closely is everything measured
with them.