The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
knowledge. According to what has been said, the rise of intelligence, from
the obscurest animal consciousness up to that of man, is a progressive
_loosening of the intellect from the will_, which appears complete,
although only as an exception, in the _genius_. Therefore genius may be
defined as the highest grade of the _objectivity_ of knowledge. The
condition of this, which so seldom occurs, is a decidedly larger measure
of intelligence than is required for the service of the will, which
constitutes its basis; it is accordingly this free surplus which first
really properly comes to know the world, _i.e._, comprehends it perfectly
_objectively_, and now paints pictures, composes poems, and thinks in
accordance with this comprehension.
Chapter XXIII.(3)On The Objectification Of The Will In Unconscious Nature.
That the will which we find within us does not proceed, as philosophy has
hitherto assumed, first from knowledge, and indeed is a mere modification
of it, thus something secondary, derived, and, like knowledge itself,
conditioned by the brain; but that it is the _prius_ of knowledge, the
kernel of our nature, and that original force itself which forms and
sustains the animal body, in that it carries out both its unconscious and
its conscious functions;—this is the first step in the fundamental
knowledge of my metaphysics. Paradoxical as it even now seems to many that
the will in itself is without knowledge, yet the scholastics in some way
already recognised and confessed it; for Jul. Cæs. Vaninus (that well‐
known sacrifice to fanaticism and priestly fury), who was thoroughly
versed in their philosophy, says in his “_Amphitheatro_,” p. 181:
“_Voluntas potentia cœca est, ex scholasticorum opinione_.” That, further,
it is that same will which in the plant forms the bud in order to develop
the leaf and the flower out of it; nay, that the regular form of the
crystal is only the trace which its momentary effort has left behind, and
that in general, as the true and only αυτοματον, in the proper sense of
the word, it lies at the foundation of all the forces of unorganised
nature, plays, acts, in all their multifarious phenomena, imparts power to
their laws, and even in the crudest mass manifests itself as gravity;—this
insight is the second step in that fundamental knowledge, and is brought
about by further reflection. But it would be the grossest misunderstanding
to suppose that this is a mere question of a word to denote an unknown
quantity. It is rather the most real of all real knowledge which is here
expressed in language. For it is the tracing back of that which is quite
inaccessible to our immediate knowledge, and therefore in its essence
foreign and unknown to us, which we denote by the words _force of nature_,
to that which is known to us most accurately and intimately, but which is
yet only accessible to us in our own being and directly, and must
therefore be carried over from this to other phenomena. It is the insight