The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
Primarily, then, the vital force is identical with the will, but so also
are all other forces of nature; though this is less apparent. If,
therefore, we find the recognition of a desire, _i.e._, of a will, as the
basis of _plant life_, expressed at all times, with more or less
distinctness of conception, on the other hand, the reference of the forces
of _unorganised_ nature to the same foundation is rarer in proportion as
their remoteness from our own nature is greater. In fact, the boundary
between the organised and the unorganised is the most sharply drawn in the
whole of nature, and perhaps the only one that admits of no
transgressions; so that _natura non facit saltus_ seems to suffer an
exception here. Although certain crystallisations display an external form
resembling the vegetable, yet even between the smallest lichen, the lowest
fungus, and everything unorganised there remains a fundamental and
essential difference. In the _unorganised_ body that which is essential
and permanent, thus that upon which its identity and integrity rests, is
the material, the _matter_; what is unessential and changing is, on the
other hand, the _form_. With the _organised_ body the case is exactly
reversed; for its life, _i.e._, its existence as an organised being,
simply consists in the constant change of the _material_, while the _form_
remains permanent. Its being and its identity thus lies in the _form_
alone. Therefore the continuance of the _unorganised_ body depends upon
_repose_ and exclusion from external influences: thus alone does it retain
its existence; and if this condition is perfect, such a body lasts for
ever. The continuance of the _organised_ body, on the contrary, just
depends upon continual _movement_ and the constant reception of external
influences. As soon as these are wanting and the movement in it stops it
is dead, and thereby ceases to be organic, although the trace of the
organism that has been still remains for a while. Therefore the talk,
which is so much affected in our own day, of the life of what is
unorganised, indeed of the globe itself, and that it, and also the
planetary system, is an organism, is entirely inadmissible. The predicate
life belongs only to what is organised. Every organism, however, is
throughout organised, is so in all its parts; and nowhere are these, even
in their smallest particles, composed by aggregation of what is
unorganised. Thus if the earth were an organism, all mountains and rocks,
and the whole interior of their mass, would necessarily be organised, and
accordingly really nothing unorganised would exist; and therefore the
whole conception of it would be wanting.