The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
more matter: in both cases the difference depends upon the intensity of
the acting force; for Kant (following Priestley) has quite correctly
reduced matter to forces. But even if the analogy here set up should not
be admitted as valid, and it should be insisted upon that the difference
of specific gravity can only have its ground in porosity, even this
assumption would always lead, not to atoms, but only to a perfectly dense
matter, unequally distributed among different bodies; a matter which would
certainly be no longer _compressible_, when no pores ran through it, but
yet, like the space which it fills, would always remain infinitely
_divisible_. For the fact that it would have no pores by no means involves
that no possible force could do away with the continuity of its spatial
parts. For to say that everywhere this is only possible by extending the
already existing intervals is a purely arbitrary assertion.
The assumption of atoms rests upon the two phenomena which have been
touched upon, the difference of the specific gravity of bodies and that of
their compressibility, for both are conveniently explained by the
assumption of atoms. But then both must also always be present in like
measure, which is by no means the case. For, for example, water has a far
lower specific gravity than all metals properly so called. It must thus
have fewer atoms and greater interstices between them, and consequently be
very compressible: but it is almost entirely incompressible.
The defence of atoms might be conducted in this way. One may start from
porosity and say something of this sort: All bodies have pores, and
therefore so also have all parts of a body: now if this were carried out
to infinity, there would ultimately be nothing left of a body but pores.
The refutation would be that what remained over would certainly have to be
assumed as without pores, and so far as absolutely dense, yet not on that
account as consisting of absolutely indivisible particles, atoms;
accordingly it would certainly be absolutely incompressible, but not
absolutely indivisible. It would therefore be necessary that it should be
asserted that the division of a body is only possible by penetrating into
its pores; which, however, is entirely unproved. If, however, this is
assumed, then we certainly have atoms, _i.e._, absolutely indivisible
bodies, thus bodies of such strong cohesion of their spatial parts that no
possible power can separate them: but then one may just as well assume
such bodies to be large as small, and an atom might be as big as an ox, if
it only would resist all possible attacks upon it.
Imagine two bodies of very different kinds, entirely freed from all pores
by compression, as by means of hammering, or by pulverisation;—would their
specific gravity then be the same? This would be the criterion of
dynamics.
Chapter XXIV. On Matter.