The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
Only where all _a priori_ assertions cease, therefore in the _entirely
empirical_ part of our knowledge of bodies, in their form, quality, and
definite manner of acting, does that _will_ reveal itself which we have
already recognised and established as the true inner nature of things. But
these forms and qualities always appear only as the properties and
manifestations of that very _matter_ the existence and nature of which
depends upon the subjective forms of our intellect, _i.e._, they only
become visible in it, and therefore by means of it. For that which always
exhibits itself to us is only _matter_ acting in some specially determined
manner. Out of the inner properties of such matter, properties which
cannot be further explained, proceeds every definite kind of effect of
given bodies; and yet the matter itself is never perceived, but only these
effects, and the definite properties which lie at their foundation, after
separating which, matter, as that which then remains over, is necessarily
added in thought by us; for, according to the exposition given above, it
is objectified _causality itself_. Accordingly matter is that whereby the
_will_, which constitutes the inner nature of things, becomes capable of
being apprehended, perceptible, _visible_. In this sense, then, matter is
simply the _visibility_ of the will, or the bond between the world as will
and the world as idea. It belongs to the latter inasmuch as it is the
product of the functions of the intellect, to the former inasmuch as that
which manifests itself in all material existences, _i.e._, phenomena is
the will. Therefore every object is, as thing in itself, will, and as
phenomenon, matter. If we could strip any given matter of all the
properties that come to it _a priori_, _i.e._, of all the forms of our
perception and apprehension, we would have left the thing in itself, that
which, by means of those forms, appears as the purely empirical in matter,
but which would then itself no longer appear as something extended and
active; _i.e._, we would no longer have matter before us, but the will.
This very thing in itself, or the will, in that it becomes a phenomenon,
_i.e._, enters the forms of our intellect, appears as matter, _i.e._, as
the invisible but necessarily assumed supporter of the properties which
are only visible through it. In this sense, then, matter is the visibility
of the _will_. Consequently Plotinus and Giordano Bruno were right, not
only in their sense but also in ours, when they made the paradoxical
assertion already referred to in chapter 4: Matter itself is not extended,
consequently it is incorporeal. For space, which is our form of
perception, imparts extension to matter, and corporeal existence consists
in acting, which depends upon causality, and consequently upon the form of
our understanding. On the other hand, every definite property, thus
everything empirical in matter, even gravity, depends upon that which only