But now that, in an expression which is certainly one‐sided, yet from our standpoint true, the body is called a mere idea depends upon the fact than an existence in space, as something extended, and in time, as something that changes, and more closely determined in both through the causal‐ nexus, is only possible in the _idea_, for all those determinations rest upon its forms, thus in a brain, in which accordingly such an existence appears as something objective, _i.e._, foreign; therefore even our own body can have this kind of existence only in a brain. For the knowledge which I have of my body as extended, space‐occupying, and movable, is only _indirect_: it is a picture in my brain which is brought about by means of the senses and understanding. The body is given to me _directly_ only in muscular action and in pain and pleasure, both of which primarily and directly belong to the _will_. But the combination of these two different kinds of knowledge of my own body afterwards affords the further insight that all other things which also have the objective existence described, which is primarily only in my brain, are not therefore entirely non‐ existent apart from it, but must also ultimately _in themselves_ be that which makes itself known in self‐consciousness as _will_. Chapter XXII.(1) Objective View of the Intellect. There are two fundamentally different ways of regarding the intellect, which depend upon the difference of the point of view, and, much as they are opposed to each other in consequence of this, must yet be brought into agreement. One is the _subjective_, which, starting from _within_ and taking the _consciousness_ as the given, shows us by what mechanism the world exhibits itself in it, and how, out of the materials which the senses and the understanding provide, it constructs itself in it. We must look upon Locke as the originator of this method of consideration; Kant brought it to incomparably higher perfection; and our first book also, together with its supplements, are devoted to it.