The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
Our wonder at the origin of forms in matter is at bottom like that of the
savage who looks for the first time in a mirror and marvels at his own
image which he sees there. For our own inner nature is the will, whose
mere _visibility_ is matter. Yet matter never appears otherwise than with
the _visible_, _i.e._, under the outer shell of form and quality, and
therefore is never directly apprehended, but always merely added in
thought as that which is identical in all things, under all differences of
quality and form. On this account it is more a metaphysical than a
physical principle of explanation of things, and to make all existences
arise from it is really to explain them from something which is very
mysterious; which all know it to be except those who confound attacking
with comprehending. In truth, the ultimate and exhaustive explanation of
things is by no means to be sought in matter, although certainly the
temporal origin both of unorganised forms and of organised beings is to be
sought in it. Yet it seems that the origination of organised forms, the
production of the species themselves, is almost as difficult for nature to
accomplish as it is for us to comprehend. This is indicated by the
entirely extravagant provision which nature always makes for maintaining
the species which once exist. Yet on the present surface of this planet
the will to live has gone through the scale of its objectification three
times, quite independently of each other, in a different modulation, and
also with great difference of perfection and fulness. The old world,
America, and Australia have, it is well known, each their peculiar
independent fauna, entirely different from that of the other two. Upon
each of these great continents the species are throughout different, but
yet, because all three belong to the same planet, they have a thorough
analogy with each other running parallel through them; therefore the
_genera_ are for the most part the same. In Australia this analogy can
only be very imperfectly followed because its fauna is very poor in
mammalia, and contains neither beasts of prey nor apes. On the other hand,
between the old world and America it is obvious, and in the following
manner. In mammals America always produces the inferior analogue, but in
birds and reptiles the better. Thus it has the advantage in the condor,
the macaw, the humming‐bird, and the largest batrachia and ophidia; but,
for example, instead of the elephant it has only the tapir, instead of the
lion the puma, instead of the tiger the jaguar, instead of the camel the
lama, and instead of apes proper only monkeys. Even from this last defect
it may be concluded that in America nature was not able to rise to man;
for even from the nearest grade below man, the chimpanzee and the orang‐
outang or pongo, the step to man was still an excessively great one.
Correspondingly we find that the three races of men which, both upon