The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
Let us now call to mind a truth, the fullest and most thorough proof of
which will be found in my prize essay on the freedom of the will—the truth
that on account of the absolutely universal validity of the law of
causality, the conduct or the action of all existences in this world is
always strictly _necessitated_ by the causes which in each case call it
forth. And in this respect it makes no difference whether such an action
has been occasioned by causes in the strictest sense of the word, or by
stimuli, or finally by motives, for these differences refer only to the
grade of the susceptibility of the different kinds of existences. On this
point we must entertain no illusion: the law of causality knows no
exception; but everything, from the movement of a mote in a sunbeam to the
most deeply considered action of man, is subject to it with equal
strictness. Therefore, in the whole course of the world, neither could a
mote in a sunbeam describe any other line in its flight than it has
described, nor a man act any other way than he has acted; and no truth is
more certain than this, that all that happens, be it small or great,
happens with absolute _necessity_. Consequently, at every given moment of
time, the whole condition of all things is firmly and accurately
determined by the condition which has just preceded it, and so is it with
the stream of time back to infinity and on to infinity. Thus the course of
the world is like that of a clock after it has been put together and wound
up; thus from this incontestable point of view it is a mere machine, the
aim of which we cannot see. Even if, quite without justification, nay, at
bottom, in spite of all conceivability and its conformity to law, one
should assume a first beginning, nothing would thereby be essentially
changed. For the arbitrarily assumed first condition of things would at
its origin have irrevocably determined and fixed, both as a whole and down
to the smallest detail, the state immediately following it; this state,
again, would have determined the one succeeding it, and so on _per secula
seculorum_, for the chain of causality, with its absolute strictness—this
brazen bond of necessity and fate—introduces every phenomenon irrevocably
and unalterably, just as it is. The difference merely amounts to this,
that in the case of the one assumption we would have before us a piece of
clockwork which had once been wound up, but in the case of the other a
perpetual motion; the necessity of the course, on the other hand, would
remain the same. In the prize essay already referred to I have irrefutably
proved that the action of man can make no exception here, for I showed how
it constantly proceeds with strict necessity from two factors—his
character and the motives which come to him. The character is inborn and
unalterable; the motives are introduced with necessity under the guidance
of causality by the strictly determined course of the world.