Four Phases of Morals: Socrates, Aristotle, Christianity, Utilitarianism — Socrates — John Shaqi
Four Phases of Morals: Socrates, Aristotle, Christianity, Utilitarianism
Socrates · en
figure John Calvin or any modern theological doctor relaxing his
gravity in this region so far; and yet Socrates was as veritable a
saint as Calvin, only the men were constitutionally not only
different, but adverse; besides, Socrates was a Greek, and, so far as
impressibility by mere physical beauty is concerned, this {33} implies
much. What the modern Protestant theologian would have thought it a
sin to look at in the ancient philosopher might have excited an
innocent and pious admiration. But the tolerant universality of large
human sympathy in Socrates, however difficult it may be for some men
to understand, was in fact much less an anomaly in a severe moralist
than the selfish theory of Hobbes is in a man pretending to be a man
at all. To explain such a perverse phenomenon we must bear in mind
that the love of singularity in some minds is greater than the love of
truth; that some men of great intellectual capacity are deficient in
some of the finer instincts that stir heroic breasts, and fail to
recognise in others what they have no experience of in themselves;
that in the common characters whom one meets in daily life an
essentially selfish motive can often be traced beneath the gracious
surface, where to the public eye only benevolence, philanthropy,
humility, and self-denial shine out with genial radiance; that the
scientific mind has a peculiar pleasure in tracking out such
inconsistencies; that the speculative mind in its eagerness to embrace
various phenomena under one law is apt to run a-muck against Nature,
delighting, as she does sometimes, more in the compromise of various
principles than in the triumph of one; and finally, that men trained
principally in the political and legal world often have a tendency to
transfer the selfish principles which are most considered in their
domain to other spheres of the social system, where more free scope is
given to the exercise of the benevolent and unselfish propensities.
These considerations may perhaps account for the genesis of such an
incomplete moralist as Hobbes,--it is only {34} the common instance of
a meagre plant growing up in a bad climate. Socrates, on the other
hand, surprises and puzzles us by his sheer redundancy of ethical
sensibility; as a tropical vegetation seems sometimes to smother with
the exuberance of green life the sober demands of an eye educated in a
temperate climate.