Four Phases of Morals: Socrates, Aristotle, Christianity, Utilitarianism — Socrates — John Shaqi
Four Phases of Morals: Socrates, Aristotle, Christianity, Utilitarianism
Socrates · en
It does not seem necessary, after what has been said, to expatiate
largely on the obvious deduction of the other cardinal virtues from
the Socratic principle of Reason or Truth. Wherever we turn our eyes
it will require little perspicacity to perceive that to do the right
is on all occasions to do the true thing,--as an apostle has it,
ποιεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, _to do the truth_; or, in the words of a great
son of the Porch, _not to demand that things shall be as we wish,
but to wish that things shall be as they are_. The great virtue of
Justice, for instance, which, in its widest and well-known Platonic
sense, signifies giving to every person and thing that which
properly belongs to it, is nothing but the assertion in act of the
truth in reference to their concurrent or adverse claims; for how
can a man realize in any {42} relation of life the beautiful Stoical
definition of Right given in the Institutes of Justinian--_Justitia
est constans et perpetua voluntas suum cuique tribuendi_--how can a
man assign to each person that which is properly his, unless he knows
truly the nature and natural claims not of that person only, but of
all persons with whom his claim may come into competition? It is plain
therefore that Justice is merely knowledge or reason;[42.1] and as the
claims of different parties in reference to the same thing are often
very various and complicated, hence it is that to be a just judge a
man does not require to have a benevolent nature--though in cases of
equity the kindly feelings also must come into play--so much as to
have an intellect of large range, of firm grasp, and of subtle power
of discrimination. And if anybody, with special reference to legal
decisions, chooses to ask not only what qualities constitute a good
judge, but on what principles the idea of property is founded--how he
is to know the exact boundaries of MEUM and TUUM in particular
cases,--the answer here also, on the Socratic postulate of truth and
natural reasonableness, will be obvious enough. That is mine by the
law of nature and truth and God, which is either a part of me, or the
natural and necessary, fruit and product of that vital energy which I
call ME; or, more simply, the product of my labour and the issues of
my activity are mine; and no man can have a right or a claim
consistent with the truth of things, to appropriate the fruit of that
growth whereof the root and the stem and the living branches {43} and
the vital juices are a necessary part of me.[43.1] But it is not mere
legal justice and a true apportionment of the Mine and Thine that flow
as a plain corollary from the obligation of acting the truth, but the
wider equities of Christian charity and toleration; yea, and the very
constraining power of the Golden Rule itself is evolved unmistakeably
from the same principle. For what is it that from the time of Greeks
and Romans down to very recent days has tainted the whole laws of
European countries with such harsh declarations of intolerant