The Philosophy of Spinoza — Baruch Spinoza — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Spinoza
Baruch Spinoza · en
This, however, will be better understood as we go on, for there is
another thing which I wish to be observed here--that we cannot by a
mental decree do a thing unless we recollect it. We cannot speak a word,
for instance, unless we recollect it. But it is not in the free power of
the mind either to recollect a thing or to forget it. It is believed,
therefore, that the power of the mind extends only thus far--that from a
mental decree we can speak or be silent about a thing only when we
recollect it. But when we dream that we speak, we believe that we do so
from a free decree of the mind; and yet we do not speak, or, if we do,
it is the result of a spontaneous motion of the body. We dream, again,
that we are concealing things, and that we do this by virtue of a decree
of the mind like that by which, when awake, we are silent about things
we know. We dream, again, that from a decree of the mind, we do some
things which we should not dare to do when awake. And I should like to
know, therefore, whether there are two kinds of decrees in the
mind--one belonging to dreams and the other free. If this be too great
nonsense, we must necessarily grant that this decree of the mind, which
is believed to be free, is not distinguishable from the imagination or
memory, and is nothing but the affirmation which the idea necessarily
involves in so far as it is an idea. These decrees of the mind,
therefore, arise in the mind by the same necessity as the ideas of
things actually existing. Consequently, those who believe that they
speak, or are silent, or do anything else from a free decree of the
mind, dream with their eyes open.
_The Moral Values of Determinism_
I
It remains for me now to show what service to our own lives a knowledge
of this doctrine is. This we shall easily understand from the remarks
which follow. Notice--
1. It is of service in so far as it teaches us that we do everything by
the will of God alone, and that we are partakers of the divine nature in
proportion as our actions become more and more perfect and we more and
more understand God. This doctrine, therefore, besides giving repose in
every way to the soul, has also this advantage, that it teaches us in
what our highest happiness or blessedness consists, namely, in the
knowledge of God alone, by which we are drawn to do those things only
which love and piety persuade. Hence we clearly see how greatly those
stray from the true estimation of virtue who expect to be distinguished
by God with the highest rewards for virtue and the noblest actions as if
for the completest servitude, just as if virtue itself and the service
of God were not happiness itself and the highest liberty.