Introductory observations--First period, from Henry VII. to the year 1588--Second period, from 1588 to 1640--Meeting of Parliament--Redress of grievances--Strafford's attainder--The commencement of the Civil War--Treaty from the Isle of Wight--The king's execution--Cromwell's power; his character--Indifference of the nation respecting forms of government--The Restoration--Ministry of Clarendon sod Southampton--Cabal--Dutch War--De Witt--The Prince of Orange--The Popish plot--The Habeas Corpus Act--The Exclusion Bill--Dissolution of Charles the Second's last Parliament--His power; his tyranny in Scotland; in England--Exorbitant fines--Executions--Forfeitures of charters--Despotism established--Despondency of good men--Charles's death; his character--Reflections upon the probable consequences of his reign and death. In reading the history of every country there are certain periods at which the mind naturally pauses to meditate upon, and consider them, with reference, not only to their immediate effects, but to their more remote consequences. After the wars of Marius and Sylla, and the incorporation, as it were, of all Italy with the city of Rome, we cannot but stop to consider the consequences likely to result from these important events; and in this instance we find them to be just such as might have been expected. The reign of our Henry VII. affords a field of more doubtful speculation. Every one who takes a retrospective view of the wars of York and Lancaster, and attends to the regulations effected by the policy of that prince, must see they would necessarily lead to great and important changes in the government; but what the tendency of such changes would be, and much more, in what manner they would be produced, might be a question of great difficulty. It is now the generally received opinion, and I think a probable opinion, that to the provisions of that reign we are to refer the origin, both of the unlimited power of the Tudors and of the liberties wrested by our ancestors from the Stuarts; that tyranny was their immediate, and liberty their remote, consequence; but he must have great confidence in his own sagacity who can satisfy himself that, unaided by the knowledge of subsequent events, he could, from a consideration of the causes, have foreseen the succession of effects so different.