A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the PyreneesOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the Pyrenees
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Wellington must by now have been growing much disquieted about the
event of the siege. He had spent ten days before Burgos, but since
the capture of the hornwork on the first night had accomplished
absolutely nothing. There were rumours that the Army of Portugal
was being heavily reinforced, and these were perfectly true. By the
coming up from the rear of drafts, convalescents, and stragglers,
it had received some 7,000 men of reinforcements, and by October 1
had 38,000 men with the colours--more than Wellington counted, even
including the Galicians. Souham was now in command: he had been on
leave in France at the time of the battle of Salamanca, but returned
in the last days of September and superseded Clausel. There had been
in August some intention of sending Masséna back to the Peninsula, to
replace the disabled Marmont. Clarke, the Minister of War, dispatched
him to Bayonne on his own responsibility, there being no time to
consult Napoleon, who was now nearing Moscow[38]. When the Emperor
had the question put to him he nominated Reille[39], but by the time
that his order got to Spain Souham was in full charge of the army, and
was not displaced till the campaign was over. Masséna never crossed
the frontier to relieve him, reporting himself indisposed, and unable
to face the toils of a campaign: his nomination by Clarke was never
confirmed, and he presently returned to Paris. Hearing of the gathering
strength of the Army of Portugal, Wellington remarked that he was
lucky--the French were giving him more time than he had any right to
expect[40] to deal with Burgos. Meanwhile he showed no intention, as
yet, either of abandoning the siege or of taking back to Madrid the
main part of his army, as he had repeatedly promised to do in his
letters of early September. Soult and the King were not yet showing in
any dangerous combination on the Valencian side, and till they moved
Wellington made up his mind to persevere in his unlucky siege. It is
clear that he hated to admit a failure, so long as any chance remained,
and that he was set on showing that he could ‘make bricks without
straw.’
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account