done with our own squadron alone full two months sooner, had the orders of the Admiralty, for supplying us with seamen, been punctually complied with, {20} and had we met with none of those other delays mentioned in this narration. It is true, our hopes of a speedy departure were even now somewhat damped by a subsequent order which Mr. Anson received on the 12th of September; for by that he was required to take under his convoy the _St. Albans_, with the Turky fleet, and to join the _Dragon_ and the _Winchester_, with the Streights and the American trade, at Torbay or Plymouth, and to proceed with them to sea as far as their way and ours lay together. This incumbrance of a convoy gave us some uneasiness, as we feared it might prove the means of lengthening our passage to the Maderas. However, Mr. Anson, now having the command himself, resolved to adhere to his former determination, and to tide it down the Channel with the first moderate weather; and that the junction of his convoy might occasion as little loss of time as possible, he immediately sent directions to Torbay that the fleets he was there to take under his care might be in a readiness to join him instantly on his approach. And at last, on the 18th of September, he weighed from St. Helens; and though the wind was at first contrary, had the good fortune to get clear of the Channel in four days, as will be more particularly related in the ensuing chapter. Having thus gone through the respective steps taken in the equipment of this squadron, it is sufficiently obvious how different an aspect this expedition bore at its first appointment in the beginning of January, from what it had in the latter end of September, when it left the Channel; and how much its numbers, its strength, and the probability of its success were diminished by the various incidents which took place in that interval. For instead of having all our old and ordinary seamen exchanged for such as were young and able (which the commodore was at first promised) and having our numbers compleated to their full complement, we were obliged to retain our first crews, which were very indifferent; and a deficiency of three hundred men in our numbers was no otherwise made up to us than by sending us on board a hundred and seventy men, the greatest part composed of such as were discharged from hospitals, or new-raised marines who had never been at sea before. And in the land-forces allotted to us, the change was still more disadvantageous; for there, instead of three independent companies of a hundred men each, and Bland's regiment of foot, {21} which was an old one, we had only four hundred and seventy invalids and marines, one part of them incapable of action by their age and infirmities, and the other part useless by their ignorance of their duty. But the diminishing the strength of the squadron was not the greatest inconveniency which attended these alterations; for the contests,