An essay on the foundations of geometryRussell, Bertrand
Philosophy
An essay on the foundations of geometry
Russell, Bertrand
Geometry -- Foundations
=11.= Thus Legendre's attempt broke down; but mere failure could
prove nothing. A bolder method, suggested by Gauss, was carried out
by Lobatchewsky and Bolyai[6]. If the axiom of parallels is logically
deducible from the others, we shall, by denying it and maintaining
the rest, be led to contradictions. These three mathematicians,
accordingly, attacked the problem indirectly: they denied the axiom
of parallels, and yet obtained a logically consistent Geometry. They
inferred that the axiom was logically independent of the others, and
essential to the Euclidean system. Their works, being all inspired by
this motive, may be distinguished as forming the first period in the
development of Metageometry.
The second period, inaugurated by Riemann, had a much deeper import:
it was largely philosophical in its aims and constructive in its
methods. It aimed at no less than a logical analysis of all the
essential axioms of Geometry, and regarded space as a particular
case of the more general conception of a _manifold_. Taking its
stand on the methods of analytical metrical Geometry, it established
two non-Euclidean systems, the first that of Lobatchewsky, the
second--in which the axiom of the straight line, in Euclid's form,
was also denied--a new variety, by analogy called spherical. The
leading conception in this period is the _measure of curvature_, a
term invented by Gauss, but applied by him only to surfaces. Gauss
had shown that free mobility on surfaces was only possible when the
measure of curvature was constant; Riemann and Helmholtz extended
this proposition to _n_ dimensions, and made it the fundamental
property of space.
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