Chief Burgomaster of Berlin, made me a communication which he said came from the Military Cabinet, of which General von Manteuffel was the head. According to this communication either Manteuffel or some one who was in intimate relations with him had said that Bismarck was exceptionally well fitted for the task of stamping out the Opposition in Parliament, and that when he had succeeded in doing that and the military organisation was secured, he must be set aside as he would otherwise bring about a war with Austria, and would use our increased military forces for that purpose. A conflict with Austria and a successful war against her would again drive the Conservative party from office. In order to keep the Conservatives in power it was necessary that Prussia should remain on good terms with Austria, and for that purpose they should even, if necessary, make concessions. This statement (Unruh goes on to say) looked highly probable. General Manteuffel was known as the head of the extreme Conservative or so-called Austrian party at the Prussian Court, and was much esteemed in Vienna. Bismarck had given frequent expression to his anti-Austrian plans even before he became Premier, and had indeed submitted them to the King himself. If Bismarck were to bring about a compromise with Parliament, and to conclude a peace with the popular representatives, his services, in the opinion of the Manteuffel party, would be of no further use, and he ought then to go. It would be quite different if in spite of the violent struggle with Parliament, he succeeded in carrying through the military organisation scheme. So long as the conflict with the popular representatives continued, he remained indispensable, his value increasing with the fierceness of the struggle.’