“This is a tissue of mistakes and contradictions. In the first place there is no foundation whatever for the statement that Manteuffel wished to get rid of me, and that he was the head of the Austrian party. It was rather Schleinitz who held that position, and who afterwards was in frequent intercourse with the Austrians, his salon indeed being their rendezvous. Manteuffel was by no means a partisan of Austria, but on the contrary a Prussian officer of ardent Royalist patriotism. But in that case one would have thought that if the Opposition in the Diet had been imbued with Prussian patriotism, if they had desired to see the dualism in Germany put an end to and the German idea realised through Prussia, they ought to have supported me with all their might, knowing as they did that I had exactly the same object in view. And that would also have been wise from their Liberal standpoint, since it was of course known that a victory over Austria would drive the Conservatives from power. Finally, there was no reason to apprehend my overthrow by the Austrophil Conservatives, as, according to Unruh himself, it was known that I possessed the confidence of the King, who, it was indeed said, had himself called me his spiritual doctor. The Opposition, however, instead of acting on such considerations, adopted a diametrically opposite course. They acted in an unpractical, illogical, impolitic way, and against their own interests, blinded by their stupid animosity and pettifogging dogmatism. It was necessary for the Liberals, if they desired to pursue a practical policy, to win for their cause--which could not be promoted without driving Austria out of the Confederation--the support of the King of Prussia, who had scruples as to a conflict with Austria, scruples which were encouraged by a section of his _entourage_. King William should have been gradually convinced of the necessity of breaking with the Vienna policy, and of attempting to give Prussia alone the leading position in Germany. I pursued this end, and Parliament should have done the same. Instead of doing so, however, they flew in the face of the King by refusing him the means for the reorganisation of the army, and they therefore lacked the necessary leverage for promoting their own views. There they were, floating in the air, with nothing to sustain them but the wind of their own speeches and self-conceit which deluded them into a belief in their own importance.