"In the Select Committee, I was in favor of a plan of representation in the House founded on population, as the most just and equal in its operation. I still retain that opinion. There were serious objections against this system, and it was believed by others that the towns could not be brought to consent to yield up the corporate privileges of representation, which had been enjoyed so long, and were so intimately connected with their pride and their interests. I felt constrained, therefore, with great reluctance, to yield up a favorite plan. I have lived long enough to know, that, in any question of government, something is to be yielded up on all sides. Conciliation and compromise lie at the origin of every free government; and the question never was and never can be, what is absolutely best, but what is relatively wise, just, and expedient. I have not hesitated, therefore, to support the plan of the Select Committee, as one that, on the whole, was the best that, under existing circumstances, could be obtained."[22] [22] Debates, etc., in the Convention to revise the Constitution of Massachusetts, 1820-21, p. 136 _c._ Story's Miscellaneous Writings, p. 518. Sir, I am not insensible to these considerations, or to the authority of these examples. A division of the State into districts would be a change, in conformity with abstract principles, which would interfere with existing opinions, habitudes, and prejudices of the towns, all of which must be respected. A change so important in character cannot be advantageously made, unless supported by the permanent feelings and convictions of the people. Institutions are formed _from within_, not _from without_. They spring from custom and popular faith, silently operating with internal power, not from the imposed will of a lawgiver. And our present duty here, at least on this question, may be in some measure satisfied, if we aid this growth. Two great schools of jurisprudence for a while divided the learned mind of Germany,--one known as the Historic, the other as the Didactic. The question between them was similar to that now before the Convention. The first regarded all laws and institutions as the growth of custom, under constant influences of history; the other insisted upon positive legislation, giving to them a form in conformity with abstract reason. It is clear that both were in a measure right. No lawgiver or statesman can disregard either history or abstract reason. He must contemplate both. He will faithfully study the Past, and will recognize its treasures and traditions; but, with equal fidelity, he will set his face towards the Future, where all institutions will at last be in harmony with truth.