If the Russians, in spite of their great numerical superiority, did not succeed in smashing the brave Austro-Hungarian army in the autumn of 1914 at Lemberg and on the San, that speaks for the small ability and defective mobility of the Russian army, which, it is true, made progress in these respects in the course of the War. As a result of the reckless expenditure of the Russian troops, whose leaders were always spendthrift of the lives of their men, their army remained, notwithstanding their heavy losses and the defective training of the reserves, a redoubtable adversary. In spite of all the technical improvements of the present day, the moral element proved to be, now as ever, the decisive factor in war. In the case of the Central Powers, that lofty moral strength, arising from the sense of righteous self-defence in a war which had been thrust upon them, showed its superiority to the zeal which a commercial and predatory war could kindle in our enemies. The following words of Droysen[6] completely apply to the German nation: "Certainly it is not the fortune of war which decides the question of right and wrong between States, but to succumb in the struggle for existence is evidence of disorders or weakness such as history does not forgive. Wealth and size and abundance of material resources are not sufficient. There are other and ethical factors which ensure and achieve victory: a deeply inculcated docility, an order and subordination such as give shape to the mass, a discipline such as renders it fit for use and self-confident even under failure, an emulation of all the noble passions such as steels and braces the soul, together with a strong will to direct the whole, and power of thought to point the way to the desired goal." [1] General Carl v. Clausewitz. _On War_ vol. iii., p. 101. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, Ltd., London. [_Vom Kriege. Skizzen zum VIII. Buch_, 3 Kap. B.] [2] _La Guerre_ 1870-1871. Paris, 1895. [3] Vol. i., p. 100. [4] _Die Operationen der 2 Armee an der Loire_. Berlin, 1875. E. S. Mittler und Sohn. [5] _On War_, vol. i., p. 47. [_Vom Kriege_. I, B., 3 Kap.] [6] _Preussische Politik_, V. III THE INFLUENCE OF TECHNICAL SCIENCE