XXXII. I do not deny that criminals should sometimes be pardoned; but then it should only be in those cases, where the public is as much, or more, interested in their forgiveness, than it is in their punishment. The public good is the true north, to which the wand of justice should always point. The services the guilty person has done to the commonwealth, or those which he may be expected to do to it, on account of his singular talents for doing them, are special and material considerations in such a case. The law furnishes precepts conducive to this end, in formal terms. Therefore, the death which Manlius Torquatus inflicted on his brave son, when he returned victorious, for having fought without orders, was contrary to the rules of equity. What more could have been done to one, who had returned vanquished, and who had no antecedent merit to plead which might entitle him to a pardon? XXXIII. Princes have a larger discretionary power in these matters, than their ministers of justice; not because they can pardon according to their will and pleasure; for they must be guided by their obligations to God and the commonwealth; but because the general or common interests, are more proper objects for their consideration, than for that of particular Judges. With regard to a sovereign, not only the personal services of the guilty individual, but those also of his near relations, such as his father, his wife, his brothers, and his sons, may furnish motives for conciliating a pardon, or for mitigating the punishment; and this has always been the practice of the most illustrious princes. It is masterly policy, to inform generous minds by such instances of clemency, that they cannot only acquire merit for themselves, but for their relations also. Great benefit may be derived to the community from this incentive; and many other methods of deriving advantages to the public, by a judicious dispensation of lenity or pardon, may be hit upon by princes, although it is not easy for me to point out or enumerate them.