III. I cannot help remarking a monstrous contradiction, that is very frequent in this matter. If a man of any rank or figure in the world, is told to his face that he lies, he considers himself as very seriously injured, and according to the cruel laws of human honour, is esteemed as having put up with a very gross affront, if he does not demand of the man who told him so, a very sanguinary satisfaction; but I would be glad to know, how telling a man he lies, can be a very serious injury, if lying is not esteemed a very serious defect in him who is addicted to it; or how a man can be considered as affronted, because he is told he lies, if the action of lying is not scandalous or unworthy. The degree of reproach annexed to a vice, is generally estimated according to the light in which that vice is considered by the world at large. If the vice is not held to be such a one, as tarnishes a man’s honour, his honour will not be deemed wounded by the commission of it; and it may be said of a man in such a case, that his honour is not injured. This being a notorious fact, the inference I would draw from the before-mentioned observation, is, that the frequency of lying, lessens in the generality of mankind, the abhorrence, which natural reason left to itself, has of this vice; but notwithstanding this custom, it has not diminished so thoroughly, but that there still remains in the soul of man, a clear conviction, that lying is a baseness. IV. I am confirmed in this opinion, by the observation, that a man’s denying what he has said, is looked upon as an opprobrium to him. And why is this? why because it amounts to a confession that he had before told a lie. The opprobrium cannot lie in the truth of what he now confesses; and therefore must consist in the lie which he told before. Confessing that he has lied, is a mark of sincerity, and no one need blush for having been sincere; therefore all the ignominy must be annexed to the lie. This, I say, makes it manifest to me, that their native sentiment of this matter is not so obscured in mankind, but that it represents a lie to them as a most unworthy and a vile thing. SECT. III. V. The practical error in this matter, is derived from a lie’s going unpunished, and from the laws not having prescribed any punishment for liars. Why is there no bridle to curb the propensity men have to deceive one another? and why should a man be allowed to lie to what amount he pleases at free cost? Although men are not contented with enjoying a total indemnity in this case, but frequently glory in what they have done, and go on to insult those they have imposed on, and to treat the sincerity of other men as imprudence; is not this an abominable offence, and such a one as deserves to be punished?